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Casen Ross
International Immersion Program—Cuba
Research Paper
A Cuban Claims-Settlement Agreement: The Case from History
On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced a significant policy shift
concerning American-Cuban relations, pivoting toward normalizing relations with
the country.1 Naturally, normalization will require lifting the U.S. trade embargo,
but lifting the embargo may not even be legal until outstanding claims held by
Americans are resolved against the Cuban government.2 During the Castro
Revolution, the newly formed Cuban government, expropriated hundreds of
American assets, resulting in thousands of claims. In 1964, Congress directed the
U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), a division of the Justice
Department, to determine the validity and value of these claims. After six years of
proceedings, the Commission verified nearly 6,000 claims totaling $1.7 billion. With
interest, these claims are now worth roughly $7 billion.3 Thus, as relations between
these countries continue to thaw, resolving these claims will become an increasingly
pressing priority.

See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policychanges-0 (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
2 See Jacob Gershman, Obama’s Cuba Shift Puts Spotlight on Firms’ Asset Claims
(Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/12/22/obamas-cubashift-puts-spotlight-on-firms-asset-claims/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
3 See David Glovin and Toluse Olorunnipa, Cuba Property Claims, Yielding Pennies, May
Spur Talks (Bloomberg, Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-23/cubaseized-property-claims-seen-as-yielding-pennies-on-dollar.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
1

There is a long history of agreements signed with foreign countries to resolve
bilateral claims.4 In the twentieth century, this tradition includes recognition of the
Soviet Union and resolving the hostage crisis in Iran, in addition to many other less
high-profile agreements. Agreements with the Soviet Union and Iran were subject
to intense constitutional scrutiny—Presidents stretched their Article II powers to
the limits, but the Supreme Court has yet to strike one of these agreements.5 This
paper takes for granted the constitutional basis for signing such an agreement.
Rather, the primary inquiry here is one of analogy: using prior agreements as
models, what is the possibility or likelihood of a large-scale agreement with Cuba?
This paper finds that any resolution of claims against the Cuban government
will turn on political factors, largely controlled by Congress. Past agreements have
been concluded swiftly, and relations with Cuba share many features of these past
agreements. These past agreements, however, largely involved sole executive
action—which can only go so far with Cuba, given statutory restrictions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I discusses historical claims-settlement
agreements, focusing on the Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Union and the
Algiers Accords with Iran. Part II discusses modern claims-settlement regimes but
See Evan Todd Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power: Constitutional
Authority and Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 155, 156,168 (1985) (noting
the President had exercised this authority as early as 1793 with Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson and further calling the power “generally uncontroversial”).
5 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 156 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2003); G. Edward White, The Transformation
of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1999). Accordingly, this
paper treats as well settled the constitutional basis for signing such an agreement. Rather,
the primary inquiry here is one of analogy: How would a Cuban claims-settlement
agreement compare with past claims-settlement regimes?
4

finds little favorable analogical evidence for Cuban negotiations. Part III takes
these past examples and attempts to translate them to a prospective agreement
with Cuba, injecting first-hand interviews with Cuban officials, academics, and
members of the Cuban judiciary.
I. Historical Claims Settlement Agreements
A. Litvinov Agreement
In the early 1930s, the Roosevelt Administration concluded the Litvinov
Agreement with the Soviet Union, easing tensions between the two nations dating
back to the Bolshevik Revolution.6 The parties’ ambitions for the Agreement were
impressive. Of prime importance, they sought to collect Soviet debts owed to
American citizens,7 obtain American political recognition of the Soviet state, and
release Soviet claims against the United States arising out of American assistance
for the White Armies.8
The Agreement was one of the first major actions of the Roosevelt
Administration and negotiations were begun in October 1933 at its behest—
President Roosevelt wrote to Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin suggesting the two

During World War I, when the United States sent troops to Russia to aid the “White
Armies” in efforts to displace the Bolsheviks following the October Revolution.
7 For a discussion of the nature of the Soviet debts, totaling over $336 million (1933
dollars), see Donald G. Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements: The American View 140–
78 (Syracuse Univ. Press 1965).
8 For a discussion of the Soviet claims, including over $5 million in bank deposits and $3
million in claims against American corporations, see id. at 179–98. See also John N.
Hazard, Book Review, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements: The American View, 60 Am. J.
Int’l L. 419, 419 (1966) (detailing the diplomatic efforts and further noting that the
Agreement sough to construct an American embassy building in the Soviet Union, exchange
American dollars for Soviet rubles at “reasonable rates,” and sever the link between the
Soviet Government and the American Communist Party).
6

countries begin “frank friendly conversations” to resolve their differences.9
Remarkably, President Roosevelt and Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim
Litvinov concluded correspondence just over a month later—they had architected a
deal that included significant Soviet concessions, including releasing and assigning
to the United States all American judgments (and potential judgments) in favor of
the Russian government from American nationals,10 a Soviet promise to not pursue
claims against the United States for damages arising out of American support for
the White Armies before 1920, as well as official American diplomatic recognition of
the Soviet government.11
The Senate did not ratify the Agreement—rather, it was “simply [ ] an
exchange of diplomatic correspondence.”12 This is not surprising, given the
“continued . . . opposition” in Congress to recognizing the Soviet government and an
entrenched policy established in 1917 during the Wilson Administration by then-

See Chandler P. Anderson, Recognition of Russia, 28 Am. J. Int’l L. 90, 95 (1934) (quoting
an October 10, 1933 letter from Roosevelt to Kalinin). See also id. at 90–95 (discussing a
thaw in relations in the late 1920s).
10 That is, the Soviet government pledged to release claims of the previous government
against Americans and pledged to decline to enforce any claims the previous government
might have had against Americans.
11 The full text of the agreement is available in 28 Am. J. Intl’l L. 1, 1–11 (Supp. 1934). See
also White, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 97 (cited in note 5) (claiming these Soviet concessions were
“significant”).
12 White, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 5). See also U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(requiring the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate to “make Treaties”); Curtis A. Bradley
and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law 367–91 (Wolters Kluwer 5th Ed. 2014)
(discussing the different types of executive agreements, including the “sole executive
agreement” signed in 1933); Note, Executive Agreements and the Treaty Power, 42 Colum. L.
Rev. 831, 836–37 (1942) (noting that judicial authority for the agreements’ validity was
“meagre [sp]”).
9

Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby to refuse the “Bolshevik regime in Russia.”13
That said, President Roosevelt did have constitutional authority to conclude the
agreement, as the Supreme Court subsequently upheld in both United States v.
Belmont and United States v. Pink. Thus, given external political pressure and
opposition, it was arguably solely as a result of President Roosevelt’s personal
determination to conclude an agreement with the Soviets that the Litvinov
Agreement was signed.
B. Algiers Accords
The events surrounding the Algiers Accords have all the elements of a
Hollywood blockbuster—diplomatic hostages, held in the wake of a foreign
revolution, a failed rescue attempt by the American military, and fever-pitched
political intrigue in the United States.14 These much more exciting circumstances
begot a much more technical agreement between the United States and Iran.
The Accords consisted of two Declarations15—the first (commonly known as
the “General Declaration”), provided for the release of American hostages in
exchange for the United States’ transfer of Iranian assets frozen in the United
States. The second Declaration (commonly known as the “Claims Settlement
Agreement”) established the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, which was

The Soviet Union: The Question of Recognition, in E.C. Buehler, B.W. Maxwell, and R.R.
Pflaum, eds., Selected Articles on Recognition of Soviet Russia 238, 239–40 (1931); White, 85
Va. L. Rev. at 77, 97 (cited in note XX).
14 Indeed, this course of events was the subject of a Hollywood blockbuster. See Argo
(Warner Bros. Pictures, 2012).
15 The Declarations themselves were issued by the government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria on January 19, 1981. The Algerian government brokered the
talks in Algiers—thus the name.
13

afforded exclusive jurisdiction over “claims of nationals in the United States against
Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States,” including related
counterclaims, arising out of “debts, contracts, . . . expropriations or other measures
affecting property rights,” as well as over official claims of the United States and
Iran against each other “arising out of contractual arrangements between them for
the purchase and sale of goods and services.”16
Contrasting with the Litvinov Agreement, the Accords were borne out of
political expediency. From 1941–1979, the United States was a supporter of the
“Shah” of Iran (that is, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi), whose reign ended with a
revolution and his abdication. After the revolution, American interests were subject
to widespread nationalization, expropriation, intervention, and termination of
contractual arrangements. The situation escalated, however, when President Carter
admitted the Shah to the United States for cancer treatment—in response, roughly
3,000 Iranian students swarmed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 63
Americans hostage.17 The American reaction was swift and market driven: over $12
billion in Iranian assets and claims in the United States were frozen—both private-

Algiers Accords, Art. II, § 1; Art. II, § 2. For a broad overview of the Accords, see Monroe
Leigh, Jurisdiction—Corporate Nationality, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 642, 642 n. a1 (1983). For a
discussion of the Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction and its initial constitutive elements, see
Charles N. Brower and Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 26–
124 (Martinus Nijhoff 1998); David D. Caron and John R. Cook, Getting Started, in David
D. Caron and John R. Cook, eds., The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Process
of International Claims Resolution: A Study by the Panel on State Responsibility of the
American Society of International Law 11–18 (Transnational Publishers 2000).
17 See Philip F. Napoli, A Historical Overview, in Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lawrence W.
Newman, and John M. Walker, Jr., eds., Revolutionary Days: The Iran Hostage Crisis and
the Hague Claims Tribunal—A Look Back 5–7 (Juris Publishing 1999).
16

and government-owned property—a freeze whose scope was “unprecedented.”18 The
American hostages were held for 444 days, released with the Accords’ signature in
1981.
As with the Litvinov Agreement, the Algiers Accords were a sole executive
agreement—they were not blessed by Congress.19 President Carter’s actions to
freeze Iranian claims were rooted in express statutory authorization,20 but his
authority to suspend claims in American courts was less clear. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court upheld the Accords’ suspension of claims, looking to a “looser sense”
of congressional acceptance of a “broad scope for executive action” to conclude such
international agreements.21
Thus, political expediency and a “general tenor” of Congressional acceptance
led to resolving billions of dollars in claims and establishing an independent
tribunal of unprecedented scope—furnishing hope and a potential model for
negotiations with Cuba.

Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze Iranian Assets, in Lowenfeld, Newman, and
Walker, Revolutionary Days 11 (discussing the long history of complex banking and
commercial relations between the two countries that made the freeze unlike prior similar
actions against Cuba, North Korea, and China). See also id. at 19 (discussing the “sub rosa,
economic mini-war,” in which Iranians attempted to wage a boycott of the dollar, while the
United States encouraged other countries to deny Iran the use of non-dollar facilities); id. at
20–21 (claiming the State Department was fairly uncertain about the scope of the asset
seizure until late-January 1981).
19 See supra note 9 [XX].
20 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669–70 (approvingly citing the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) § 203, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)).
21 The Supreme Court in Dames & Moore found neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1732 afforded the President express statutory authority to suspend foreign claims
in American courts, but together, they informed a “general tenor of Congress’ legislation in
[the] area,” such that the President was acting with “the acceptance of” Congress. Id. at
677–78.
18

II. Modern Claims-Settlement Regimes
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC), established in 1954, is a
“quasi-judicial, independent agency” within the U.S. Department of Justice and
adjudicates the claims of U.S. nationals against foreign citizens.22 The FCSC has
jurisdiction to settle claims when Congress so delegates, pursuant to an
international agreement, or at the request of the Secretary of State; and funds for
FCSC awards are taken from congressional appropriations, international claims
settlements, or the Department of Justice’s or Treasury’s liquidation of foreign
assets in the United States.
The FCSC and its precursor agencies have resolved 43 claims programs
against various countries, totaling more than 660,000 claims and awards in the
billions of dollars.23 Currently, the Commission has three active programs under
agreements signed with Albania, Libya, and Iraq. Each is considered in turn as an
example of current government practice that may be analogized to Cuba.

See Anuj C. Desai and Sylvia M. Becker, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the
United States: 2013 Annual Report at *1–3, available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/fcsc/docs/annrep13.pdf (last visited April 17, 2015)
(noting the FCSC assumed the functions of two prior agencies—the War Claims
Commission and the International Claims Commission). See also International Claims
Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq.; War Claims Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2001–2017.
23 See, e.g., Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S.: Completed Programs
http://www.justice.gov/fcsc/completed-programs (last visited April 17, 2015) (listing 16
recently completed programs).
22

A. Albania
The agreement with Albania was signed on March 10, 1995,24 settling claims
between citizens of the United States and Albania levied against the respective
foreign governments, arising out of military action taken at the end of World War
II.25 Albania agreed to pay the United States $2 million, to be distributed by the
FCSC, while the United States released gold due to Albania under reparations
agreements concluding World War II.26
The Albanian agreement provides evidence that even ossified legal
positions—here, claims that were nearly 50 years old—are not immune from
resolution under an international agreement.
B. Libya
Congress unanimously passed the Libyan Claims Resolution Act,27 creating a
$1.8 billion victim compensation fund for claims arising out of terrorist incidents in
the 1980s blamed on Libya (though for which Libya did not accept responsibility), as

For a text of the agreement, see Ronald J. Bettauer, Albania-United States: Agreement on
the Settlement of Certain Outstanding Claims and Financial Issues, 34 Int’l Legal Materials
595, 597–99 (1995). See also Exec. Order No. 13,477, 74 Fed. Reg. 65965 (Oct. 31, 2008)
(ordering settlement of claims); Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States of
America and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirirya, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/109771.pdf (last visited April 17, 2015).
25 U.S. citizen claims were largely based on expropriation and other loss of property to the
Communist regime that seized power in Albania at the end of World War II.
26 See Bettauer, 34 Int’l Legal Materials at 595. See also Sally J. Cummins, Digest of the
United States Practice in International Law 502–03 (Oxford University Press 2008).
27 A Bill to Resolve Pending Claims Against Libya by United States Nationals, and for
Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 110-301 (Aug. 4, 2008).
24

well as compensation for Libyan victims of U.S. airstrikes in Tripoli and Benghazi
in the 1980s.28
As opposed to all other settlement agreements discussed above, the Libya
claims settlement involved only tort claims—no contractual claims. Additionally,
Congress and the President acted in perfect harmony—there was not a partisan
element to the agreement. As such, the Libyan settlement is not likely to prove a
useful analogy for Cuba.
C. Iraq
Similar to Libya, the Claims Settlement Agreement with Iraq was entered
into to resolve tort claims of U.S. citizens and their families against Iraq for hostage
taking and other injuries in violation of international law.29 Unlike the Libya
agreement, however, the Iraq agreement was signed under the broad authority
granted to the Secretary of State per the International Claims Settlement Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1623(a)(1)(C), rather than an explicit grant from Congress. Indeed, there
was no sharp statement from Congress, and despite “disbelief and anger” from the

For a description of the claims settlement, see Libya pays $1.5 billion to settle terrorism
claims (CNN, Nov. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/10/31/libya.payment/index.html?iref=topnews
(last visited April 17, 2015). See also Royce C. Lamberth, The Role of Courts in Foreign
Affairs, in John Norton Moore, ed., Foreign Affairs Litigation in United States Courts 10–12
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013).
29 These claims are based in injuries from the First Gulf War, when hundreds of American
soldiers were used as human shields. See Agreement between the United States of America
and Iraq, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/191781.pdf (last visited
April 17, 2015); Letter from Mary E. McLeod to the Honorable Anuj C. Desai and Sylvia M.
Becker (Oct. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/10/21/iraq_claims_second_
referral_10-7-2014.pdf (last visited April 17, 2015) (referring the claims to the FCSC and
explaining the State Department’s categorization of pending claims).
28

Iraqi people,30 the Iraqi claims settlement has proceeded without significant
controversy.
Thus, the Iraqi agreement, similar to the Libya agreement, does not appear
to be a useful analogy to a prospective Cuban settlement.
III. The Cuban Dilemma
Settling the thousands of American claims against the Cuban government is
not likely to happen soon, but it is (currently) a statutory requirement before the
embargo may be lifted.31 This Part discusses the primary barriers to reaching an
agreement, including threshold issues, the main hurdles for the United States
(political and statutory), the primary points of contention, and whether prior
agreements furnish hope for a successful agreement with Cuba.
A. Threshold Issues
At this writing, U.S-Cuba relations are constantly evolving, lurching toward
full normalization of relations. In late March 2015, Chief of the Political Section for
the U.S. Interest Section in Cuba, Justin Davis, claimed that the current focus of
negotiations would be removing Cuba from the United States’ list of State Sponsors
of Terrorism.32 In mid-April, however, President Obama announced that he intends

Nizar Latif and Phil Sands, Iraqis Outraged at Payout for US Victims of Saddam (Middle
East Online, Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://www.middle-eastonline.com/english/?id=41341 (last visited April 17, 2015).
31 See 22 U.S.C. § 6067(d). As will be discussed, this statutory requirement may be
unconstitutional as an impermissible restriction on the Executive’s power to recognize
foreign countries.
32 See U.S. Department of State: State Sponsors of Terrorism, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited April 17, 2015).
30

to remove Cuba from this list.33 Of course, this presidential designation is not the
end of the story—a joint resolution from the House and Senate could block the
removal. Regardless, President Obama’s announcement is an indication that U.S.Cuba relations continue to evolve quickly.
After removing it from the State Sponsors of Terrorism, the United States
would require establishing a full diplomatic embassy in Cuba, as opposed to the
current “Interest Section.” Though the interest section operates as a “de facto
embassy,” normalizing relations would assuredly require the establishment of a full
embassy. Again, however, this is likely to occur in the near future—Roberta
Jacobson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
recently said embassies in each country could be open as early as mid-April.34
B. Hurdles for the United States
The most significant hurdles to a successful claims settlement agreement are
political and statutory. Politically, congressional Republicans have vocally opposed
any normalization of relations with Cuba—Senator Marco Rubio has characterized
President Obama’s Cuba relations as a “concession to tyranny”; Senator Ted Cruz
claimed President Obama has “made [relations] worse”; and Speaker of the House

Randal C. Archibold and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Cuba to Be Removed from U.S. List of
Nations that Sponsor Terrorism (N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2015), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/world/americas/obama-cuba-remove-from-state-terrorlist.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting that Cuba’s place on the list has recently
emerged as a “sticking point in negotiations” to normalize relations).
34 Serena Marshall and Jim Avila, Cuba and US a Step Closer to Reopening Embassies
(ABC News, Feb. 27, 2015), available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/cuba-us-stepcloser-reopening-embassies/story?id=29285150 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
33

John Boehner criticized the turn of relations as deeply “misguided.”35 Indeed,
Republicans have pledged to deny funds to reopen the embassy in Havana, stall the
nomination of an ambassador, and “ignore” White House requests to lift the
embargo.36
Statutory obstacles are even more ominous.37 Before allowing a normalization
of relations, the Helms-Burton Act38 requires the President to determine, inter alia,
that the Cuban government is democratically elected under “free and fair” elections,
the government shows “respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights” of
Cuban citizens, the government is “substantially moving toward a market-oriented
economic system based on the right to own and enjoy property,” and the government
has made “demonstrable progress” to establishing an independent judiciary.”39
Though the President could, ostensibly, act by executive action in affirming these
requirements, it would certainly not be in good faith, as Political Section Chief
Justin Davis noted in an interview. On the other hand, Congress could amend

Sean Sullivan and Ed O’Keefe, GOP Lawmakers Blast Obama’s Cuba Policy Shift
(Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2014/12/17/cuba-deal-reaction-sharply-split-on-capitol-hill/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2015).
36 Lauren French, How Republicans Could Stop Obama’s Cuba Play (Politico, Dec. 18,
2014), available at http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/congress-cuba-reaction113654.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). But see Deb Riechmann, Despite Pushback from
Lawmakers, There’s Little Chance Congress can Stop Cuba Policy (PBS Newshour, Dec. 18,
2014), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/despite-pushback-lawmakerstheres-little-chance-congress-can-stop-cuba-policy/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
37 Cf. Litvinov Agreement, which was concluded without any statutory restriction.
38 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091.
39 22 U.S.C. § 6066. See also 22 U.S.C. §§ 6063, 6065. But see Peter Schroeder, Can Obama
Lift Cuba Embargo Alone? (The Hill, Dec. 17, 2014), available at
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/227442-can-obama-lift-cuba-embargo-without-congress
(last visited Apr. 17, 2015) (noting a litany of actions that President Obama may take
without congressional approval to “chip away” at the embargo).
35

Helms-Burton to remove these statutory requirements. Indeed, Republican Senator
Jeff Flake purportedly supports such an action.40
C. Primary Points of Contention
Any claims settlement with Cuba will inevitably involve competing
valuations of two aggregate values: American citizens’ claims against the Cuban
government for expropriated property and Cuban claims for damage to the Cuban
economy as a result of the United States’ economic embargo. Indeed, Former Cuban
Supreme Court Justice, Elpidio Pérez Suàres calls this “one of our most complicated
problems.” This is further complicated by the fact that in the late 1950s, Cuba
attempted to pay to settle claims with an increased sugar quota, but President
Eisenhower cut the sugar quota, in a first step toward what would become a full
embargo.41 For Cuba, this action represented an arbitrary decision by the United
States that Cuba could not pay to settle American claims, and was effectively an
American decision to walk away from the bargaining table, when Cuba was ready
and willing to resolve the countries’ disputes.42 Thus, from a Cuban perspective, the
United States would need to explain its prior malcontent to overcome Cuban
skepticism.

See Letter from Senators Jeff Flake and Paul Ryan to President Barack Obama (Jan. 28,
2015), available at http://www.flake.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7b4ccf5c-54eb-4e20-a2b19b9f27cfe90f/01.28.2015-flake-paul-gop-coalition-letter-on-us-cuba-reform.pdf (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015).
41 Proclamation No. 3355, 74 Stat. C72 (1960).
42 In separate personal interviews, Vladimir Falcón, representative for the Cuban Institute
for Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP), and Former Justice Suàres independently
confirmed this finding.
40

Next, the baseline value of claims is complicated by multiple developments.
First, as Former Justice Suàres noted, several claims against Cuba have already
been presented to an American tribunal, with a judgment executed against Cuba—
despite the fact that Cuba denies that any American tribunal would have
jurisdiction to hear the claim. These judgments, which Cuba considers void as a
threshold issue, would need to be offset or reclaimed in order to pursue any
comprehensive claims-settlement program. Second, as Representative Falcón
explained, there is the issue of Cubans whose property was seized by the Castro
government during the Revolution, who did not initially come to the United States
but have emigrated sometime after 1960. Would their claims be included in the
prospective agreement?43 Suàres calls these “calcification problems” that have
arisen from the embargo’s extended duration.
The next “sticking point” is the fact that the Cuban government views the
American embargo as a violation of international law, and losses to the Cuban
economy as a result of the embargo must be compensated.44 This could be a
substantial sum, but even the Cuban government cannot decide how to calculate
the extent of damages. Vice Foreign Minister Abelardo Moreno claims that at
current prices, a conservative estimate of economic damages would be in excess of
Former Justice Suàres posed a similar hypothetical, highlighting the case of Castillo Rum
and its claims against the Cuban government. The owner and daughter of the company are
Cuban, the family’s rum factory was nationalized, but the father has since passed away,
never having emigrated to the United States. His daughter, however, has. Does the
daughter inherit the father’s claim, now that she is present in the United States?
44 Representative Falcón, of ICAP, for one, takes this view. See also generally Nigel D.
White, The Cuban Embargo under International Law: El Bloqueo (Routledge 2014) (viewing
the American embargo of Cuba as a “serious violation” of international law, and further
claiming that the embargo undermines the use of sanctions around the world).
43

$104 billion, but if one considers the devaluation of the U.S. dollar against the price
of gold on international financial markets, damages reach nearly $1 trillion.45 This
is a substantial discrepancy that will require resolution to come to a final
agreement.
D. Hope? Comparing to Other Settlement Agreements
U.S.-Cuba relations have many features of prior agreements that suggest the
parties will be able to reach a claims-settlement agreement, but there are also
features that caution skepticism. This Section first examines aspects that favor an
expeditious settlement, and then it examines aspects that disfavor an expeditious
settlement.
1. Favoring Settlement
Executive Support. Clearly, the most ardent supporter of a Cuban settlement
is President Obama. Just as President Roosevelt substantially expedited the
Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Union, President Obama’s initiative to change
relations with Cuba will certainly expedite a claims-settlement agreement.
Ossified Relations. At first blush, decades of frozen relations with Cuba would
suggest negotiating a claims-settlement agreement would prove impossible.

Portia Siegelbaum, Cuba: U.S. Embargo Causes $1 Trillion in Losses (CBS News Sept.
14, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cuba-us-embargo-causes-1-trillion-inlosses/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). For a more recent estimate, see Daniel Trotta, Cuba
Estimates Total Damage of U.S. Embrgo at $116.8 Billion (Reuters, Sept. 9, 2014),
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/us-cuba-usaidUSKBN0H422Y20140909 (last visited Apr. 18, 2015) (claiming damage to Cuba’s foreign
trade at $3.9 billion from April 2013 to June 2014 alone).
45

Fortunately, history has not borne this out. The agreement with Albania was
concluded after over fifty years, for one.46
Negotiating with a Politically Averse Country. Dissenters to resetting
relations with Cuba have disclaimed negotiating with a Communist state.
Certainly, this would not be the first instance in which the United States has
concluded an agreement with a country with politically averse interests. Both the
Litvinov Agreement and the Algiers Accords were signed with regimes that were
much more adverse to the United States’ interests than is Cuba. Similarly, the
agreement with Albania required negotiating with a Communist government.
Presence of Hostages. President Obama’s December 2014 announcement was
directly preceded with a hostage exchange between the United States and Cuba.
Likewise, the Algiers Accords were expedited on account of American hostages in
Tehran. The fact that hostages are no longer part of the equation with Cuba may
work against an expeditious settlement, but that the United States has already
concluded such a high-stakes agreement with Cuba provides evidence that further
diplomatic agreements are foreseeable.
2. Disfavoring Settlement
Statutory Obstacles. No prior claims-settlement agreement has involved
statutory restrictions—much less restrictions as stringent as those in the HelmsBurton Act. Further, no other negotiation would have required congressional
authorization of any sort. To be sure, the most significant agreements discussed
Additionally, the agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded after over a decade of
tense relations, during politically hostile times, when it was far from clear that the
Communists would be recognized by the United States.
46

above—the Litvinov Agreement and the Algiers Accords—were sole executive
agreements. That is, Congress was entirely uninvolved with the negotiation process.
As alluded to above, these statutory obstacles and requirement for congressional
approval will likely prove to be the most substantial obstacle to a claims agreement
with Cuba.
Strong Political Lobby. A majority of congressional Republicans have vocally
opposed any change in relations with Cuba, much less finalizing an claimssettlement agreement with the country. This political opposition could prove fatal to
success in reaching any agreement. Just as any ordinary statutory agreement may
founder in Congress, any claims-agreement with Cuba must pass through Congress’
veto gates. The presence of a strong political lobby is also likely to cause a Cuban
claims-settlement agreement to flounder, as congressional Republicans may erect
numerous procedural gates to ever even voting on an agreement.
Political Expediency (or Lack Thereof). One factor that suggests a claimssettlement agreement is far from expected is the lack of political expediency. As
opposed to both the Litvinov Agreement and the Algiers Accords, the United States
is not due to realize a substantial benefit from a claims-settlement agreement with
Cuba. That is, there are no hostages to be released, and creditors with claims
against the Cuban government are hardly clamoring for immediate relief. Indeed,
there is a sizeable contingent of Cuban-Americans concentrated in Florida that are
staunchly opposed to normalizing relations with Cuba, including resolving claims.

Conclusion
Historical precedent provides a wealth of examples of instances in which the
United States has successfully concluded a large-scale claims-settlement agreement
with a foreign government. Of course, relations with Cuba are unique in many
ways—not to mention the statutory framework and restrictions imposed by the
Helms-Burton Act. Regardless, certain aspects of this agreement that may
otherwise suggest an agreement would be impossible have actually been
encountered—and successfully overcome—in past negotiations.

